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 1 Introduction
In the last two decades, many countries launched extensive privatization pro-
grams. Despite this growing experience, we still lack empirical and theoretical
knowledge of some critical issues. Does privatization result in more eﬃcient
ﬁrms? How does ﬁrm’s technology change as ownership is transferred from pub-
lic to private hands? In this paper, we address these questions as we empirically
examine the eﬀects of privatization on the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency, input, output and
investment choices with a panel data set of 23 Turkish cement ﬁrms which were
privatized between 1989 and 1998. We ﬁnd that both productive and alloca-
tional eﬃciency increase and ﬁrms switch to a more capital intensive technology
as a result of privatization. Since change in technology is likely to be responsi-
ble for eﬃciency gains, we theoretically examine how and why the technology
choice of the public ﬁrm may diﬀer than a private one.
Privatization in Turkey started almost ﬁfteen years ago, with the apparent
reason to relieve the state from the burdens of ineﬃcient state industries and
to create revenue for the government. Since then, numerous state companies
have been sold to private sector. We focus on cement ﬁrms for several reasons:
First, the availability of a panel data set enables us to control for both ﬁrm and
time speciﬁce ﬀects, thereby allowing us to avoid problems with unobserved
heterogeneity that has plagued earlier research. Second, the cement industry
has some elements of a natural (regional) monopoly, and public ownership is
considered to be one of the main solutions to the problems of market failure
that arise in this type of market structure. Hence, if privatization increases
productive eﬃciency without much translating into higher consumer prices in
such a market, then we have all the more reason to be hopeful of its success
elsewhere. Third, Turkey is the largest cement producer in Europe and eighth
in the world.
1There is a growing empirical literature analyzing the relationship between
ownership and economic performance (See Megginson and Netter (2001)f o ra n
excellent survey). Unfortunately, this literature, either compares private and
public ﬁr m sa tt h es a m ep o i n ti nt i m e -( B a r b e r i se ta l .( 1996), Cragg and Dyck
(1999), Estrin and Rosevear (1999) or is gathered from studies of privatiza-
tion or nationalization of the “before-after” variety which examine the averages
of key variables before and after privatization and test for signiﬁcant changes.
(Megginson et al. (1994), Ecker et al. (1997), La-Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes
(1997)). Cross-sectional studies cannot satisfactorily control for ﬁrm-speciﬁce f -
fects, while “before-after” studies cannot satisfactorily control for period eﬀects.
In this study, using a panel data set, we control for both ﬁrm-speciﬁce f -
fects and period eﬀects when testing for changes in economic performance after
privatization. Because we have data on employment, capital, output, sales,
investment, capacity, prices and proﬁts, we are able to look at a more com-
plete picture of privatization, unlike most studies that only analyze the eﬀect
of privatization on one variable such as employment. Previous studies are also
susceptible to sample selection problems since ﬁrms they examine were selected
for privatization while other ﬁrms in the same industry remained public. As our
sample includes pre and post privatization data for all cement ﬁrms which were
once state owned, we are able to avoid the problem of endogeneity associated
with sample selection.
Our results show that privatization reduces per unit costs and prices signiﬁ-
cantly while labor productivity and output increase substantially indicating an
improvement in both productive and allocational eﬃciency. We ﬁnd evidence
that technology becomes more capital intensive as both capital endowment and
capital labor ratio increase. Increases in investment and capacity accompany
these changes.
In this paper we focus on gains in productive eﬃciency and argue that
2changes in technology choice are likely to be responsible for these improvements.
We argue that public ﬁrm’s technology choice depends on the politician’s pref-
erences which in turn reﬂect the preferences of the majority of the voters. In
labor abundant countries like Turkey, the majority of voters would favor labor-
intensive technologies, and hence such technologies will be adopted by public
ﬁrms often at the expense of productive eﬃciency.
Does the ﬁrm change its technology from labor intensive to capital intensive
after privatization? Our results on capital and employment utilization seem
to say yes. We further investigate the answer to this question by estimating a
Cobb-Douglas production function and allowing for structural changes in the
contributions of capital and labor to the value of output when ﬁrms are pri-
vatized. Our results indicate that the contribution of capital to the value of
output increases signiﬁcantly while the contribution of labor decreases. These
results have an important implication for the empirical literature on privatiza-
tion. Many studies of privatization use rate of return on assets–deﬁned as the
ratio of sales to assets (capital)– as a measure of ﬁrm eﬃciency (Villalonga
(2000)). If the privatized ﬁrm is increasing its capital as well as its sales as it
switches to a more capital intensive technology, then this variable will not be
an appropriate measure of ﬁrm eﬃciency in these studies.
In the next section we review the empirical literature on the eﬀects of pri-
vatization on ﬁrm eﬃciency and technology choice as well as the theoretical
literature on the eﬀects of public ownership on the same variables. In section 3,
we develop a simple model, which endogenizes the politician’s technology choice
for the public ﬁrm by making this choice the outcome of an electoral process.
In other words, on the basis of individual optimization, each individual deter-
mines her preferred technology choice for the public ﬁrm and these preferences
are “aggregated” into a public sectorwide technology policy via the collective
choice mechanism in place. Our results indicate that this model explains the
3diﬀerences in employment and capital choices between state owned and priva-
tized ﬁrms for Turkey’s cement industry. Section 4, describes the privatization
environment in Turkey and the data we use. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Empirical Literature on Privatization
The Eﬀects of Privatization on Firm Eﬃciency
The evidence presented by the empirical cross-sectional literature on whether
privatized ﬁrms are more eﬃcient is mixed. By using a survey of 452 Russian
shops, Barberis et al. (1996) show that the existence of new owners and man-
agers increases the chances of restructuring and renovation. Using data from
U.K., Cragg and Dyck (1999) ﬁnd that privatized ﬁrms with at least four years
in the private sector, like established publicly traded ﬁrms, exhibit a signiﬁ-
cant negative relationship between improved performance and the probability
of resignation whereas state owned ﬁrms show no such relationship. Contrary
to these studies, using survey data from Ukraine, Estrin and Rosevear (1999)
refute the hypothesis that private ownership per se is associated with improved
performance as they ﬁnd the private ownership dummy to be insigniﬁcant in
regressions explaining sales, employment or proﬁts.
The “before-after” studies seem to ﬁnd a more robust positive relationship
between privatization and increased eﬃciency. Eckel et al. (1997), ﬁnd that
stock prices of U.S. competitors and airfares in markets served by British Air-
ways fell signiﬁcantly upon privatization. Megginson et al. (1994) ﬁnd that
state owned ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial and operating performance increase moderately fol-
lowing privatization. La Porta and Lopes-De-Silanes (1997) ﬁnd evidence of
large increases in proﬁtability of Mexican ﬁrms following privatization and at-
4tribute most of the increases to gains in productivity, rather than to increases
in product prices and transfers from laid-oﬀ workers to the privatized ﬁrms.
Three notable exceptions to studies with only cross-section or before-after
dimension are by Ehrlich et al. (1994), Frydman et al. (1999) and Villalonga
(2000). All three studies control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and Frydman et al. also
control for time eﬀects with year dummies. Unfortunately, the results of these
studies on privatization and ﬁrm eﬃciency are mixed. Ehrlich et al. use a
sample of 23 comparable international airlines of diﬀerent ownership categories
over the period 1973-83 for which they are able to obtain good and comparable
cost, output and ownership data. Their results suggest that private ownership
leads to higher rates of productivity growth and declining costs in the long run,
and these diﬀerences are not aﬀected by the degree of market competition or
regulation. Their estimates suggest that the short-run eﬀects of changes from
state to private ownership on productivity and costs are ambiguous.
Frydman et al., ﬁnd that privatization to outsider owners has signiﬁcant
eﬀects on revenue performance, but not on cost reduction using data from the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, on 218 state owned ﬁrms of which 128
were privatized during the 1990-1994 period. We should note that testing the
eﬀects of privatization on ﬁrm performance is even more diﬃcult in transition
economies than in non-transition economies as privatization in these countries
occurs at the same time as and is part of, other massive economy-wide changes.
Villalonga (2000) examines 24 Spanish ﬁrms from diﬀerent industries and
ﬁnd that privatization does not increase eﬃciency–deﬁned as rate of return on
assets. He argues that political factors such as the business cycle during which
the ﬁrm is privatized and foreign ownership are important deteminants of ﬁrm
eﬃciency.
The Eﬀects of Privatization on Firm Technology
Empirical studies on the eﬀects of privatization do not directly examine the
5changes in technology choice as a result of privatization. Rather, they report
changes in employment and capital investment, which may suggest a change in
technology. In their survey article, Megginson and Netter (2001)r e p o r tt h a t
almost all of the 22 studies from non-transition economies that they review ﬁnd
that capital investment spending increases signiﬁcantly as ﬁrms are privatized.
Perhaps surprisingly, they report that these studies are far less unanimous re-
garding the impact of privatization on employment levels in privatized ﬁrms.
La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999), in their “before and after” type of
study of 233 privatized Mexican ﬁrms, ﬁnd that ratio of investment to sales
and investment to ﬁxed assets signiﬁcantly increase after privatization while
employment signiﬁcantly decreases. Furthermore, they present results from a
survey of 74 of these ﬁrms where their CEOs were asked to rate the importance
of twelve factors–that are listed in the survey–as explanations for the gains in
proﬁtability. In that survey, half of the respondents assign the maximum score
to the introduction of new production processes.
In a longitudinal study not covered in Megginson and Netter (2001), Bhaskar
a n dK h a n( 1995) ﬁnd that privatization has a large and signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on white-collar workers using employment data from Bangladesh, for 62
jute mills of which 31 were privatized in 1982 and controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects.
2.2 Theoretical Literature on Public Ownership
The economic theory of privatization is a subset of the vast literature on the
economics of ownership and the role for government ownership of productive
resources. There are two main branches in this literature: The Social View and
the Agency View.
According to Social View (Shapiro and Willig (1990)), state owned enter-
prises are capable of curing market failures by implementing pricing policies
6that take account of social marginal costs and beneﬁts of production. A pri-
vately owned ﬁrm is expected to maximize proﬁts whereas a state owned ﬁrm is
expected to maximize social welfare, according to this view. For example, in a
natural monopoly market structure, eﬃciency calls for a single ﬁrm to exist. But
ap r o ﬁt maximizing monopoly will charge too high of a price and produce too
low of a quantity. This potential ineﬃciency can be solved by state ownership.
The Agency View of ﬁrm ownership presents a strong critique of this theory.
There are two complementary strands of the literature diﬀering on whether the
agency conﬂict is with the manager or with the politician. Vickers and Yarrow
(1988) argue that managers of state owned enterprises (SOEs) may lack high-
powered incentives or proper monitoring. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stress that
political interference in the ﬁrm results in excessive employment, poor choices of
product and location, lack of investments and ill-deﬁned incentives for managers.
The main limitation of both the Social View and the Agency View models is
that they simply posit objective functions for politicians/managers rather than
deriving them from explicit models of the political process. While the Agency
View is a relevant critique to the Social View, it assumes a very dismal political
or managerial structure in order to make its case. For example, according to
one version of the Agency View, the public is disorganized and politicians cater
to interest groups, such as labor unions, rather than the median voter and this
is the source of ineﬃciency (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)).
Even if we assume that politicians do cater to interest groups, it is not clear
why labor unions should aim to induce excess employment. Unions protect
the interests of insiders as opposed to outsiders. Strong unions can explain
high wages, but why they should necessarily use their inﬂuence to increase
employment in the state owned ﬁrm is far from clear unless we assume that
there are competing unions each with the aim of increasing its market share
by gaining more members. Furthermore, why should labor unions be the most
7inﬂuential interest group? We could envision a model similar to Shleifer and
Vishny’s where businesses that provide capital inputs to the ﬁrm are the interest
groups with inﬂuence over politicians. If that is the case, then we would expect
that the state ﬁrm is over-capitalized rather than over-staﬀed. Hence predictions
of these models change as we change the objective function imposed on the state
owned ﬁrm.
The Social View, unequivocally predicts that the eﬃcient technology will
be chosen by the state owned ﬁrms. Models of Agency View on the other
hand, while predicting that ineﬃcient technologies will be chosen by politi-
cians/managers, have ambiguous predictions for the direction of the distortion
in the production process. They either predict that state owned ﬁrms will have
low investment levels (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)) or will use excess capital
as well as excess labor (Vickers and Yarrow (1988)). The over-capitalization
argument stems from bureaucratic ineﬃciency models. The founder of this
line of literature, Niskanen (1975), proposed that bureaucrats are inclined to
maximize their total budget rather than the utility of their sponsors. In the
context of a state-owned enterprise, this translates into over-investment and
over-capitalization to justify perks and high salaries.
3 Technology Choice Under Public Ownership
In this section we endogenize the politician’s technology choice for the public
ﬁrm by making this choice the outcome of an electoral process which aggregates
voters’ preferences according to majority rule. We believe that this approach has
advantages over making arbitrary assumptions about the politicians’ objective
function, as it will give us predictions for public sector’s technology choices
based on voter characteristics.
If the size of the public sector is signiﬁcant then the input choices and hence
8the technology choice of this sector will naturally be issues debated during elec-
tions. Megginson and Netter (2001) report that the public sector was indeed
signiﬁcant in many countries before massive privatization programs started to
take place 25 years ago. More speciﬁcally, public sector formed 8.5 percent of
GDP in high-income countries in 1984; in the low income countries, the av-
erage SOE share of national output was 16 percent at that time! Therefore,
the public has a reason to be concerned in the choices of such a large sector.
In case of Turkey, we observe a historically heavy reliance on SOEs which were
established during the 1930s by the government to jump-start the economy that
collapsed with the end of the Ottoman era in 1923. Over the years SOEs grew
enormously, leaving the control of the economy to political parties that came to
power. Each state owned enterprise belonged to the jurisdiction of individual
government ministers, who were elected members of the parliament and SOE
jobs were given to constituencies after elections (Ficici (2001)).
We propose that a politician who is seeking to maximize his votes can cred-
ibly promise to having a high level of employment in the public sector by com-
mitting this sector to a labor intensive technology. In a labor abundant country
such as Turkey, if voters are to choose between labor-intensive versus capital-
intensive technologies, majority of the voters are likely to favor a labor-intensive
technology for the public sector even if this technology choice is ineﬃcient.
3.1 A Simple Model
In this section, we propose a simple model where there are two types of tech-
nology available to the public ﬁrm and they diﬀer according to their labor in-
tensity. The voters who diﬀer according to their labor and capital endowment,
have preferences over these technologies and vote according to their preferences.
The politician imposes the technology on the public ﬁrm which is preferred by
the majority (the median voter) of the voters.
9This model is rooted in models where individuals know their income when
they choose a transfer scheme. Meltzer and Richard (1981)p r e s e n tam o d e l
of majority voting over simple income tax schedules meant to ﬁnance redis-
tributive transfers. Their model illustrates some of the fundamental results on
the connection between the characteristics of the income distribution and the
nature of tax-transfer programs in the context of a simple model in which all
individuals face the same linear tax rate and receive the same transfer. In our
framework, individuals diﬀer in their labor and capital endowment and transfers
are in the form of employment opportunities in the public ﬁr m .I fa ni n e ﬃcient
labor-intensive technology is imposed on the public ﬁrm as a result of the elec-
toral process, prices for the consumption goods produced by the public ﬁrm will
be higher and these high prices are similar to a tax that voters have to pay to
ﬁnance the public sector employees’ wages.
The basic set up can be described as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage,
voters choose which technology the state owned ﬁrm should use. In the second
stage, the politician adopts the technology preferred by the majority of voters
(the median voter) and sets price equal to marginal cost of production. We
formalize this framework below.
Assume that a country has a population of N people where N is an even
number. Individuals diﬀer in terms of their labor and capital endowments. We
will assume that N
2 +1 of the individuals are endowed with labor hours (laborers)
and N
2 − 1 of them are endowed with capital (capitalists). The reason for this
assumption is to have a set up where the majority of voters (the median voter)
is interested in employment opportunities in the public sector. Utility of i for
i ∈ {1,...,N} is log linear in the consumption good and leisure and linear in the
numeraire good,
10U = alny +l n( T − l)+z (1)
where y is the consumption good produced by the public ﬁrm, l is the hours
worked, T is the total time endowment and z is the numeraire good. We assume
that a ≥ 0. Individual i0s budget constraint is given by
py + z = wl + I if i is a laborer
rk + J if i is a capitalist (2)
where p is the price of the consumption good, l is hours worked by the laborer,
k is the amount of capital supplied by the capitalist, w i st h ew a g er a t e ,r is the
rental rate of capital and I (J) is unearned income of the laborer (capitalist).
We assume that there is a competitive world market for capital and capitalists
have no market value for their labor. One motivation for the distinction between
laborers and capitalists is that laborers are younger and hence are able to work
while the capitalists are older and are not able to work but have accumulated
capital.
Individual i maximizes his utility, equation 1 subject to his budget con-
straint, equation 2 by choosing his demand for the consumption good
y =
a
p
(3)
and his supply of hours worked:
lS =
T − 1
w for w> 1
T
0f o r w ≤ 1
T
(4)
where lS is the amount of labor supply by a laborer at equilibrium wage rate
and labor supply by the capitalist is 0.
We will assume that there are two technologies available to the public ﬁrm
and the politician chooses the technology that is preferred by the majority of
the voters. Hence, production technology that is adopted by the state ﬁrm is
11given by
Y =
L if majority prefers technology 1
K if majority prefers technology 2 (5)
We will assume that the ﬁrm sets price equal to marginal cost for each technology
choice.
p = w if technology 1 is chosen
r if technology 2 is chosen (6)
Hence, the indirect utility function of individual i is given by
aln a
w − lnw + wT − 1 − ai is a laborer; technology 1 is chosen
aln a
r +l nT − ai is a laborer; technology 2 is chosen
aln a
p +l nT + rk − ai is a capitalist
(7)
We deﬁne social welfare as the sum of the utilities of individuals:
SocialWelfare =
N X
i=1
Ui (8)
After some algebra, we ﬁnd that social welfare is higher under technology 2
than under technology 1 if
r<
w
exp
¡1
a
N+2
2N (wT − lnwT − 1)
¢ (9)
In this framework, we will assume that a technology is eﬃcient if social welfare is
maximized when that technology is adopted. Hence, equation 9 is the necessary
condition for technology 2 to be eﬃcient. Note that if we were only concerned
about productive eﬃciency, r<wwould be suﬃcient for technology 2 to be
eﬃcient.
A laborer votes for technology 1 if her utility under technology 1 is higher
than under technology 2
aln
a
w
− lnw + wT − 1 − a>aln
a
r
+l nT − a (10)
12This condition simpliﬁes to simpliﬁes to
r>
w
exp
¡1
a (wT − lnwT − 1)
¢ (11)
Since the laborer is the median voter in this example, his preferred technology
will be voted for by the majority of the voters. Hence, the ineﬃcient technology
will be preferred by the majority of voters if equations 9 and 11 both hold.
Let LD ¡
LS¢
represent total labor demand (supply) in this economy if tech-
nology 1 is chosen. At equilibrium,
LS = LD (12)
µ
N
2
+ 1
¶µ
T −
1
w
¶
= N
a
w
The equilibrium wage rate is
w =
Na+ N+2
2
N+2
2 T
(13)
Note that at equilibrium, wT − lnwT −1 > 0, and hence, the upper bound for
r in 9 is always higher than the lower bound in 11
Conditions 9 and 9 can further be illustrated in a graph by substituting for
w from equation 13 and setting N = 100 and T =2 4 . In the graph below,
the horizontal axis denotes a and the vertical axis denotes r. The upper line
represents the upper bound and the lower line represents the lower bound that
r can be such that the ineﬃcient technology will be chosen as the electoral
outcome.
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13As can be seen from the graph, the range of r that the ineﬃcient technology
will be chosen increases in a. In other words, as individuals value the consump-
tion good more highly the probability of an ineﬃcient outcome increases. The
upper bound for r is there to ensure that the capital intensive technology is
more eﬃcient.
It is intuitive that this upper bound is relaxed–that it increases–as indi-
viduals value the consumption good more. In other words, r and hence the price
of the consumption good does not have to be very low in order to ensure that
social welfare is higher under the capital intensive technology when individuals
have a high value for the consumption good.
The lower bound for r is there to ensure that the median voter–the laborer–
will vote for the labor intensive technology. The lower bound tightens as a
increases. This is also natural since the trade oﬀ that the laborer faces–higher
price for y in exchange for labor income–increases as the laborer values the
consumption good more. The lower bound, however increases at a slower rate
than the upper bound since the upperbound incorporates the eﬃciency losses
not only from the trade-oﬀ faced by the laborers but also the losses of the
capitalists.
3.2 Model Implications
Our model implies that labor intensive technologies will be adopted in labor
abundant countries where the median voter is likely to care about the employ-
ment opportunities in the public sector. We showed that when there is a choice
between two types of linear technologies, the technology preferred by the median
voter is not necessarily the eﬃcient one.
In fact, if we assumed a Cobb-Douglas technology function and had voters
choose from a continuum of technologies by choosing the labor intensity of the
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation, we would have found that the outcome of the polit-
14ical economy equilibrium and the eﬃcient technology would always be diﬀerent.
We do not present results with this technology since the model can not be solved
analytically. Results which we get through comparison of ﬁrst order equations
are available upon request.
The reader may ask, if there is a more eﬃcient technology available, why it
is then not possible to adopt this technology and compensate the loosing par-
ties (in this case the laborers) from the eﬃciency gains of the capital intensive
technology. There are two reasons why this move towards the eﬃcient outcome
may not be realized. First, it is diﬃcult to credibly commit to such a scheme.
In other words, it may be diﬃcult to convince workers that they will receive
transfers when they will no longer be necessary in the production process. A la-
bor intensive technology choice which is not easily reversible, provides a credible
commitment to the workers, whereas a promise that they shall be compensated
if the public ﬁrm chooses the capital intensive technology may not be so credi-
ble. Second, holding out for a better deal, may stall the bargaining process that
will lead to a decision on the terms of compensation for the laborers if they vote
for the more eﬃcient technology (Alesina and Drazen (1991)).
What should we expect as the public ﬁrm is privatized? If the technology of
the public ﬁrm is distorted towards a labor intensive technology, then we expect
the privatized ﬁrm to switch to a more capital intensive technology by decreasing
its labor force and increasing its capital holdings. Labor productivity should
increase. The ﬁrm to increase its investment in order to increase its capital.
We expect the ﬁrm to become more eﬃcient and decrease its per-unit costs. If
the privatized ﬁrm operates in a suﬃciently competitive market then we expect
eﬃciency gains to be reﬂected in the form of reduced prices and output should
increase.
However, the eﬀect of privatization on rate of return on assets, which is the
ratio of earnings (value of sales) to the value of assets (capital) is ambiguous.
15This variable is often used as a measure of eﬃciency of the privatized ﬁrm,
especially in cross-industry privatization studies (Villalonga (2000)). If the pri-
vatized ﬁrm is increasing the value of its assets (capital) as implied by our model,
then this may not be a meaningful measure of eﬃciency for the privatized ﬁrm.
Value of sales may be increasing as a result of privatization, but the assets might
also be increasing if the ﬁrm is switching to a more capital intensive technology.
Therefore rate of return on assets may go up or down depending on which eﬀect
will dominate.
4 Background and Data
Privatization in Turkey started almost 15 years ago, in order to relieve the state
from the burdens of state industries, and generate revenue for the government. It
is interesting to note that, privatization started under the ﬁrst civil government
after a military regime between 1980-1983. In the post military period, all of
the former political parties and their leaders were banned from politics and the
new conservative right of the center party, (Motherland Party) which was in
power during this period, faced little political opposition in implementing its
privatization programs. However, the privatization reforms have not been fully
carried out as intended, due to a lack of legal framework and conﬂicting laws
in the country’s constitution with regard to privatization. Still numerous state
companies have passed to private sector since then, including all the cement
ﬁrms that were formerly owned by the state. The Privatization High Council
is the ultimate decision-making body for privatization, under the chairmanship
of the Prime Minister. Sales of these cement ﬁrms were realized through block
sales to actual persons or entities.
Since, our sample includes all cement ﬁrms in Turkey which were formerly
public we are able to look at a more complete picture of privatization and avoid
16the problem endogeneity associated with sample selection. All the public ce-
ment establishments that ever existed were privatized between 1989 and 1998.
Our data spans a period of 1981-1999 for many of the variables of interest,
though the time series is shorter for some variables and the panel is not always
balanced. Table 1 presents the time table of the privatizations of the cement es-
tablishments. Our data on output, employment, investment, capacity, and per
unit costs are constructed from the oﬃcial statistics of Privatization Adminis-
tration of Turkey. Our data on capital and sales are constructed from Istanbul
Chamber of Industry 500 largest ﬁrms of Turkey surveys. Table 2 describes the
variables used in our regressions.
Ozmucur (1998) studied a panel of public and private cement establishments,
using the results of Istanbul Chamber of Industry 500 largest ﬁrms of Turkey
surveys. He estimated a separate equation for each ﬁrm to determine the year
of structural change for employment and labor productivity for the 1981-1995
period and had at most 14 observations for each equation he estimated. He
found that structural change coincided with time of privatization for public
ﬁrms and reduction in employment which to a degree happened in all ﬁrms was
signiﬁcantly higher in the privatized ﬁrms.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 3 presents the comparison of the three year averages of the variables of in-
terest before and after privatization. Results indicate that productivity, capital
utilization, output and investment are signiﬁcantly higher whereas employment,
per-unit costs and prices are signiﬁcantly lower in the post privatization period.
Increase in capacity is not found to be signiﬁcant. Fall in prices during this pe-
riod may be due to an increase in competition among the cement ﬁrms and/or
decrease in marginal costs of production.
17Table 4 presents the results of the panel regressions for input and output
choices of ﬁrms on the privatization dummy, which is equal to 1 for the post-
privatization period of each ﬁrm and 0 otherwise. In this set of regressions
we control for ﬁrm speciﬁca n dp e r i o de ﬀects by adopting a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation and employing year dummies as regressors. Results indicate that
output, labor productivity, capital and capital labor ratio signiﬁcantly increase
while employment signiﬁcantly decreases in the post privatization period.
Table 5 presents the same set of regressions as in Table 4 but this time ﬁrm
eﬀects are random. Random eﬀects model is more eﬃcient if it is consistent.
We test the consistency of the random eﬀects speciﬁcation by using a Hausman
Test. As shown in the table, for all regressions with the exception of employment
output, we fail to reject that the random ﬁrm eﬀects speciﬁcation is consistent
and therefore are able to estimate the coeﬃcient on the privatization dummy
eﬃciently and consistently. The signiﬁcance and signs of the coeﬃcients on the
privatization dummy are the same as in the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcations of Table
4.
Table 6 analyzes how privatization aﬀects variables such as capacity choice,
investment, per-unit costs and prices that are more likely to change in the
longer-run. In fact, we ﬁnd that our privatization dummy is positive but not
signiﬁcant for capacity and investment choices (columns 1 and 3). When we
consider that these variables might not change immediately after privatization,
and use a privatization dummy that is equal to one for the period one year after
privatization takes place, we ﬁnd this dummy to be positive and signiﬁcant on
the capacity and investment choices (columns 2 and 4).
Per-unit costs and prices appear to fall in the post privatization period. This
implies that the productive eﬃciency gains do not come at the expense of con-
sumers in the form of higher prices. Table 7 presents the same set of regressions
as in Table 6 using ﬁrm random eﬀects. Hausman test fails to reject that the
18random eﬀects speciﬁcation is consistent for capacity and price regressions while
it rejects this hypothesis for investment and per unit cost regressions. Hence
the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation should be used for these variables. The magnitudes
of the coeﬃcients are similar to that of the ﬁxed eﬀect regressions.
Our yearly dummies may not accurately capture the eﬀects of the business
cycle on ﬁrm eﬃciency. It would be interesting to see 1) How our ﬁrm eﬃciency
measures move with the business cycle and 2) whether privatization eﬀect will
be still there when we control for the changes in the aggregate economy.
Hence we present results controlling for an industry production index con-
structed by Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) which measures the production
level in total manufacturing industries (Table 8). We scale this variable by pop-
ulation of Turkey to get the per capita production level. In these regressions
our dependent variables are labor productivity, log of sales over employment
and per unit costs. We control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects as well as capacity of the
ﬁrm to control for the ﬁrm size which changes over years and which may aﬀect
ﬁrm eﬃciency measures. We also include a time trend variable which is equal
to 1, 15 years prior to privatization and equal to 26, 10 years after privatization.
As we would expect the log of the ratio of sales over employment co-moves
with the business cycle: the industry production index has a positive and signif-
icant eﬀect on this ratio. It is reassuring to observe that the privatization eﬀect
remains positive and signiﬁcant in this regression (regression 2). Privatization
eﬀect remains positive and signiﬁcant in the labor productivity and negative
and signiﬁcant in the per-unit costs regression, consistent with our earlier re-
sults. Capacity has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity and a
negative, though not signiﬁcant eﬀect on per unit costs. This makes sense since
we would expect the cement industry to experience considerable economies of
scale.
Next, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function and allow for struc-
19tural change in the coeﬃcients of capital and labor due to privatization. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of sales (earnings from the sale of
output) in 1,000,000 and corrected for inﬂation. Our series on capital and sales
do not have information on the post privatization periods of ﬁrms that were
privatized after 1992. Hence we test for the possible structural changes in the
production function for ﬁrms that were privatized in 1989 and 1992. Our ex-
planatory variables are log of employment, log of capital, a dummy (P89) which
is equal to 1 for the post-privatization period of ﬁrms that were privatized in
1989, another dummy (P92) which is equal to 1 for the post privatization period
of ﬁrms that were privatized in 1992 and the interaction of these two dummy
variables with log employment and log capital. We include yearly time dummies,
and assume that observations are correlated for the same ﬁrm but independent
across ﬁrms and estimate an OLS regression (Table 9).
This regression clearly indicates that a technological shift occurs as a result
of privatization. Both of the privatization dummies are positive and signiﬁcant
indicating an increase in productivity as a result of privatization. Furthermore,
the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms for employment are negative and sig-
niﬁcant, and the interaction of P92 with log capital is positive and signiﬁcant.
These results indicate a signiﬁcant increase in the contribution of capital and a
signiﬁcant decrease in the contribution of labor to the value of output due to
privatization.
The privatization eﬀects we ﬁnd are quite robust, driven neither by a few
well-performing privatized ﬁrms nor by a few poorly performing state ﬁrms and
they remain virtually unchanged when the data is trimmed at the ﬁfth and
ninety-ﬁfth percentiles. These regressions though not presented are available
upon request.
206 Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁnd that privatized ﬁrms change their choice of technology as
they increase their capital, investment and output while decreasing employment.
Contribution of capital to the value of output increases while the contribution of
labor to the value of output decreases as ﬁrms are privatized. The new technol-
ogy choice is eﬃcient since the per-unit cost of production is reduced signiﬁcantly
while prices are not increased to consumers. Hence evidence strongly suggests
that privatized ﬁrm improves both allocational and internal eﬃciency.
Evidence we presented in this paper is consistent with the technology choice
view that we developed. If the public sector is signiﬁcant in a country then
the employment choices of this sector will be of direct interest to the voters.
Our model shows that a labor intensive technology is likely to be chosen as the
outcome of an electoral process and this technology need not be eﬃcient. Results
of empirical literature on privatization also ﬁnds that capital spending increases
signiﬁcantly after privatization (Megginson and Netter (2001)) consistent with
our model implications.
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24Table 1: The privatized cement factories in Turkey: 
Year Privatized  Privatized Firms 
1989  Afyon, Ankara, Balikesir, Soke, Pinarhisar  
1992  Corum, Denizli, Gaziantep, Iskenderun, Nigde, Sivas, Trabzon. 
1993  Askale, Bartin, Ladik, Sanliurfa,  
1995 Adiyaman 
1996  Elazig,  Kars, Lalapasa, Van. 
1997 Ergani 
1998 Kurtalan 
 
Table 2: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Capacity  The Minimum Efficient Scale of the firm, measured in tons 
scaled by 1000. 
Capital  Assets measured in Turkish Liras, deflated by the Wholesale 
Price Index of Central Bank of Turkey, 1987=100 and scaled 
by 1,000,000. 
Capital/Labor 
Ratio 
Capital divided by number of workers 
Employment  The number of workers employed by the firm 
Labor productivity  Per capita cement production, measured in tons 
 
Investment  The Investment Expenditures of the firm, measured in 
Turkish Liras, deflated by the Wholesale Price Index and 
scaled by 1,000,000 
Output  Output sold by the Firm, measured in tons scaled by 1000. 
Log  Sales  Natural logarithm of sales measured in Turkish Liras, 
deflated by the Price Index and scaled by 1,000,000.  
Profit  The net profit of the firm (net of operating costs and 
investment), measured in Turkish Liras, and deflated by the 
Wholesale Price Index and scaled by 1,000,000. 
Prices  The sale price per ton, deflated by Wholesale Price index and 
scaled by 1,000,000 
Per  Unit  Cost  Calculated by subtracting profits and investment 
expenditures from revenues and dividing this operating cost 
by the output sold (in TL scaled by 1,000,000).  
Table 3: Comparison of Means Three Years Before and After Privatization
† 
 
VARIABLE NUMBER 
OF 
OBSERVAT
IONS 
BEFORE 
PRIVATIZAT
ION MEAN 
AFTER 
PRIVATIZATI
ON MEAN 
T-VALUE  PR >T 
Optimum Capacity  23  510.58  567.03  1.37  0.1720 
Log Employment  23  5.7089  5.2012  -11.47***  0.000 
Investment 23 847.64  2137.7  2.98*** 0.0034 
Price 23  34319  30667  -2.80***  0.0062 
Per Unit Cost  23  0.0317  0.027  -2.41**  0.0176 
Capital/Labor Ratio  23  0.8716  1.8821  4.36***  0.000 
Output 23  367.91  427.84  2.49**  0.014 
Production per Capita  23  1.2252  2.4377  7.53***  0.001 
Capital 23  285.28  362.97  1.76*  0.08 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
†Data from the three years before and after the year of privatization are included in the before privatization 
and after privatization data sets respectively.  If data was missing for one or two of these years for a given 
firm in the pre (post) privatization period, we also excluded the symmetric year in the post (pre) 
privatization period to ensure that the comparison is symmetric.  
  
 
Table 4: The Effect of Privatization on Input and Output: Firm Fixed Effects 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Employment 
(Log) 
Output Productivity Capital 
Labor 
Ratio 
Capital 
Privatization 
Effect 
 
-0.3013*** 
(-8.00) 
42.2018* 
(2.29) 
0.8468*** 
(7.75) 
37.942*** 
(3.23) 
6300.65*** 
(2.76) 
Year Dummies† 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
F Statistic  67.39  6.31 
 
40.19 
 
8.49 
 
4.67 
 
Overall R
2 
 
0.71 0.10 0.71 0.35  0.19 
Test Statistics for 
the Equality of 
Firm Effects 
 
F=10.31 F=21.47 F=15.24 F=6.48 F=9.52 
No of Obs  364  279  279  239  240 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
†Dummy variables are used for each year in the 1982-1999 period, for employment and for each year in the 
1985-1998 period for output and labor productivity regressions. For capital and capital-labor ratio and 
capita, year dummies are used for each year in the period of 1982-1997.  
Table 5: The Effect of Privatization on Input and Output Choices: Firm Random Effects 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Employment 
(Log) 
Output Productivity  Capital 
Labor 
Ratio 
Capital 
Privatization 
Effect 
 
-0.299*** 
(-8.28) 
55.014*** 
(2.96) 
0.911*** 
(8.45) 
42.439*** 
(3.95) 
6310.858*** 
(2.91) 
Year 
Dummies† 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald Statistic 
 
1276.67 89.09 591.65  147.01  77.45 
Overall R
2 
 
0.71 0.11 0.50  0.36  0.20 
Number of 
Observations 
 
364 279 279  239  240 
Hausman test 
(p-value)  N/A N/A 0.76  1.00  1.00 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
†Dummy variables are used for each year in the period of 1982-1999 for employment and for each year in 
the 1985-1998 period, for output and labor productivity regressions. For capital-labor ratio and capital 
regressions, year dummies are used for each year in the period of 1982-1997. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6: The Effects of Privatization on Capacity, Investment, Costs and Prices:  
Firm Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Capacity 
 
Capacity Investment  Investment  Per 
Unit 
Costs 
Price 
Privatization 
Effect 
 
19.442 
(0.82) 
48.916** 
(2.02) 
1640.506 
(1.58) 
2797.802***   
(2.64) 
-.005** 
(-2.06) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.86) 
Year 
Dummies† 
 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-Statistic 
 
6.00 6.31  1.01  1.33  3.28  39.71 
Overall R
2 
 
0.05 0.07  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.62 
Test Statistics 
for the 
Equality of 
Firm Effects 
 
43.74 43.90  2.46  2.41  3.67  5.05 
No of 
Observations 
279  279  279  279     203  203 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
†Dummy variables are used for each year in the period of 1985-1998, for capacity and investment 
regressions. For per-unit cost and price variables, year dummies are used for years 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 7: The Effects of Privatization on Capacity, Investment, Costs and Prices:  
Firm Random Effects 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Capacity 
 
Capacity Investment  Investment  Per 
Unit 
Costs 
Price 
Privatization 
Effect 
 
22.37 
(0.96) 
51.708** 
(2.16) 
2482.974*** 
(2.74) 
3278.30***    
(3.63) 
-.004*     
(-1.95) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.07) 
 
Year 
Dummies† 
 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald Statistic 
 
90.66 95.81  16.23  22.18  29.32  436.08 
Overall R
2 
 
0.06 0.07  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.63 
Number of 
Observations 
 
279 279  279  279  203  203 
Hausman test  
(p-value)  1.000 1.000  0.000  0.0002  N/A  0.3714 
t-statistics are in parenthesis.  
***Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
†Dummy variables are used for each year in the period of 1985-1998, for capacity and investment 
regressions. For per-unit cost and price variables, year dummies are used for years 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
  
 
Table 8: The Effects of Privatization on Firm Efficiency controlling for the 
 Business Cycle: Firm Fixed Effects 
      
      
Dependent Variable  Productivity  Log (Sales/Employment)  Per Unit Costs 
      
Privatization Effect  0.461**  0.308**  -0.004* 
 (4.01)  (4.30)  (-1.93) 
      
Time trend  0.157**  0.03  -0.001* 
 (6.16)  -1.74  (-2.21) 
      
Firm Capacity  0.001**  0  0 
 (3.28)  (1.08)  (-1.14) 
      
Industry Production Index  -22.728  85.44*  0.828 
 (-0.47)  (2.54)  (0.87) 
      
Constant -1.038*  2.048**  0.043** 
 (-2.02)  (6.28)  (3.97) 
      
Test Statistics for the   F=5.14  F=3.27  F=2 
Equality of Firm Effects       
Observations 274  162  203 
Number of firm  23  21  23 
R-squared 0.73  0.7  0.19 
t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  
Table 9 Effects of Privatization on the Production Function 
Dependent Variable: Log Sales         
Estimation Method: OLS         
  Coefficient  t-statistic  
        
Log Capital  0.256  **
* 
4.07  
Log Employment  0.837  **
* 
3.79  
Log Capital*Private after 1989  0.054    0.53   
Log Capital*Private after 1992  0.235  **
* 
3.03  
Log Employment*Private after 1989  -0.544  **
* 
-2.70  
Log Employment*Private after 1992  -0.738  **
* 
-3.05  
Private after 1989 (=1)  2.908  **
* 
2.29  
Private after 1992 (=1)  2.105    1.31   
Year dummies  yes       
R-squared 0.648       
Number of observations  243.000       
        
Log Sales and Log Capital are corrected for inflation and in 1,000,000 TL  
Observations are assumed independent across firms but not within firms. 
 
 